PSRA’s power is that it can strike, which can decrease the quality of the on-field product, and consequently decrease the revenue MLS generates from match attendance and TV audiences. This power is contingent on referee solidarity. If PSRA, and more broadly, the referee community, does not stay together, the strike may fall apart, and the collective bargaining will fail as a result. A failed strike would be a devastating blow to the PRSA credibility, which is still relatively young.
PRO (MLS) has the
advantage of being the top-level of soccer in the country. This may allow them
the ability to influence referees to work matches during the strike. These
referees may be USSF referees not within PSRA, foreign referees, or a
combination of both. MLS may also be able to withstand a strike with the
revenue it has collected from season passes, from renting out soccer stadiums
for special events, or other such alternative streams of cash. Their power will
be linked to MLS fans’ reaction to a referee strike; if fans are not responsive,
the strike will not alter the league’s ability to make money. However, unhappy
fans that do see a decrease in the MLS product due to the replacement referees
will increase the pressure on PRO to end the referee strike. If replacement
referees do not alter the fan’s experience, it will be much tougher for PRSA to
continue their strike.
Aside from
power, there are a variety of bargaining sub-processes that either side will
have to choose during collective bargaining. These choices can be seen as
zero-sum bargaining known as distributive
bargaining and integrative bargaining,
which focuses on improving working conditions and worker productivity. Additionally,
both sides may have to confront issues of intra-organizational
bargaining and trust.
Distributive
bargaining is viewed as zero-sum bargaining. A win for one side is a loss for
the other side. A wage increase is a win for PSRA, but a loss for the MLS. In
this case a loss for MLS may be further compounded by the impending player’s
contract next year. A win for referees will make management look vulnerable to
similar strike threats from the players’ union.
Integrative
bargaining is viewed as a win-win. Integrative bargaining topics may be
improving referees’ access to physical trainers, more flexible flight
arrangements, locker room conditions, and other measure that could increase
worker productivity in various ways. These topics are beneficial to both sides
since improved working conditions for referees could result in better
refereeing, which would allow for an improved product on the field. The cost of this increased productivity may be less than the increased revenue, and general rule changes can improve referees’ satisfaction and happiness. These sort of resolutions require each side to treat the other side with respect and to avoid aggressive posturing.
Furthermore,
trust becomes crucial in the bargaining process. Both sides must make efforts
to ensure that they are trustworthy. This is one reason the unfair labor charge
PSRA brought against PRO was a rattling report.
Intra-organizational bargaining is
bargaining within the same organization. This process can occasionally be an issue
for unions, and is where solidarity becomes a critical component of success.
Not only do current MLS referees need to stick together in support of the
union, but also referees outside of the union. Although these non-union referees
are not bound or obligated to PRSA, their solidarity is crucial in maintaining
a united front in the face of an impending strike. If too many non-union
referees agree to work for PRO, they will inhibit the bargaining power of PRSA.
Finally, another
key issue for PSRA will be the wage-employment-trade-off. The
wage-employment-trade-off states that at higher wages, a firm may be forced to lay
off workers. For PSRA this could come about by MLS reducing the amount of
referees in the pool for MLS. This issue may be less critical for already
established MLS referees than for referees aspiring to reach that level. The
key is to recognize if the wage-employment-trade-off is present before PSRA makes
its demands.[1]
All of the
various bargaining processes and the factors will determine what collective
bargaining agreement PSRA and PRO come to. The most critical of these are
factors that influence strike outcomes. This is true even if a strike does not
occur because a strike is the threat point in the negotiations between the two sides.
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